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**General Assembly**
**Sixty-fifth session**
Agenda item 36
**The situation in the Middle East**

**Security Council**
**Sixty-fifth year**

# Identical letters dated 18 December 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I transmit to you herewith a complaint about the Israeli enemy, which planted deep within Lebanese territory electronic devices concealed in artificial rocks (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the sixty-fifth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 36, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nawaf **Salam**
Permanent Representative

10-70630 (E) 281210 281210

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# Annex to the identical letters dated 18 December 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Lebanese Republic

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants

On 15 December 2010, the technical divisions of the Lebanese Armed Forces inspected and dismantled an electronic device concealed in an artificial rock that had been planted by Israeli enemy forces on a cliff some 1,715 metres above sea level in a rugged mountainous area between Jabal Baruk and Tallat Tumat Niha in the Lebanese Shuf that overlooks most of the towns in the Western and central Bekaa, and from which Syria and many of the towns in southern Lebanon, as far as the borders with Palestine, may be seen. Field investigations carried out by the Lebanese Army discovered two rocks that had been planted in the aforementioned area, each of which was around one cubic metre in size. The first concealed an electronic communications transmitter and receiver device, while the second contained a large number of panels to provide energy for the device in the first rock. The device had seven directive antennas, which were employed as follows: five were directed towards Ruwaysat al-Alam in occupied Palestinian territory, while the other two were directed towards the villages of the Western Bekaa, on a line beginning at the rock, and passing through Lala towards Masna' on the Lebanese-Syrian borders. Inside the electronic device were a number of electronic components for transmitting and receiving, some of which were made in the United States of America, while others were manufactured by Israeli companies. Markings in both Hebrew and English clearly showed that their origin was Israeli. It was evident to the Lebanese Army that the purpose of the device was to effect communication between sites inside Lebanese territory and the Israeli position at Ruwaysat al-Alam, where there are numerous communications and eavesdropping stations.

The technical divisions of the Lebanese Armed Forces also detected and dismantled a second system which the Israeli forces had planted on the heights of 'Arid al-Tuwaihan on Jabal Sannin, in a very rugged mountainous area some 2,500 metres above sea level. That device, which was extremely well concealed, was a cylindrical camera hidden in a grey imitation rock made of fibreglass. A second rock, found some 1.5 metres south of the first, was a transmitting and receiving device. The system was powered by three plastic battery packs that were reinforced in order to withstand both atmospheric conditions and heavy weights. Both items were buried in the ground and connected in such a way as to ensure that they would continue to function for a lengthy period. The second device comprised the following components:

- The optic system: this consisted of a sophisticated device for long-distance surveillance which comprised two cameras, one for daylight use and the other with infrared night vision, and a laser device to determine distances and/or coordinates. The device had a complicated and sophisticated mechanical operating system and was linked to its operators by wireless apparatus that governs and operates it and transmits information and pictures.

- Picture transmission apparatus: comprising a device for transmitting pictures and a patch antenna.
- A system for receiving control signals.
- The system control circuit.
- The power system.

The planting by Israel of those two systems deep within Lebanese territory constitutes a flagrant violation of Lebanese sovereignty, international laws and norms, and Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), and is prejudicial to international peace and security. It also constitutes an act of aggression against Lebanese territory and confirms yet again Israel's contempt for United Nations resolutions. Lebanon demands that the Security Council assume its responsibility to maintain international peace and security and bring pressure to bear on Israel to abandon its aggressive and provocative policies towards Lebanon. The Council should also ensure that Israel complies with resolution 1701 (2006) and withdraws forthwith, unconditionally, from all Lebanese territory.

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Security Council

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## Letter dated 10 December 2010 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

Pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1575 (2004), 1639 (2005), 1722 (2006), 1785 (2007), 1845 (2008) and 1895 (2009), I have the honour to convey the attached letter dated 3 December 2010, which I received from Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, transmitting the twenty-third quarterly report on the activities of the European military mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (see annex). The report covers the period from 1 June to 31 August 2010.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

10-70623 (E) 130111

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## Annex

### Letter dated 3 December 2010 from the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1575 (2004), 1639 (2005), 1722 (2006), 1785 (2007), 1845 (2008) and 1895 (2009), I attach the twenty-third quarterly report on the activities of the European Union military mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (see enclosure). The report covers the period from 1 June to 31 August 2010.

I should be grateful if you would transmit the report to the President of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Catherine **Ashton**

## Enclosure

# Report of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the activities of the European Union military mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina

## I. Introduction

1. The present report covers the period from 1 June to 31 August 2010.

2. The Security Council in its resolutions 1575 (2004), 1639 (2005), 1722 (2006), 1785 (2007), 1845 (2008) and 1895 (2009), requested that Member States, acting through or in cooperation with the European Union, report to the Council on the activities of the European Union military mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR), through the appropriate channels and at least at three-monthly intervals. The present document is the twenty-third such report.

## II. Political background

3. The campaign for the general election on 3 October continued to be dominated by divisive political rhetoric. There was a decline in dialogue between political leaders. The 22 July advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on Kosovo also affected the political climate.

4. In respect of visa liberalization, considerable progress and strong political will for reforms were registered by the visa expert team in July. The European Commission was in the process of finalizing its assessment. Decisions by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union are expected during the fourth quarter of 2010.

5. Otherwise, however, there was little progress on the overall reform agenda. There was no progress in addressing the five objectives and two conditions required for closure of the Office of the High Representative. In the area of State and defence property, Republika Srpska announced its intention of passing a law defying the High Representative's ban on the disposal of State property prior to a final agreement by the parties. The meeting of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council, held on 29 and 30 June, expressed its concern over the lack of progress in addressing the relevant objectives for transition. It urged the authorities to ensure that the five objectives of the Office of the High Representative workplan were completed.

6. On 30 June, the Brcko Supervisor issued a supervisory order regulating the price of electricity in the District. Meanwhile closure of the supervisory regime remained on hold, pending Republika Srpska compliance with the High Representative's decisions of 18 September 2009 regarding the regulatory framework for electricity.

7. There was no progress on constitutional changes following the European Court of Human Rights ruling of December 2009. The Law on Census was adopted by the House of Representatives, but not by the House of Peoples (readings on 29 July and 2 September).

8. The financial situation, especially the Federation, continues to be difficult. At the end of August, the International Monetary Fund agreed to disburse the fourth

tranche of its loan (€38 million) since the necessary conditions had been met. Disbursement was expected by the end of September.

## III. Security situation and activities of the European Union military mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina

9. The overall security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina remained calm and stable throughout the reporting period. Although nationalistic rhetoric persisted, it had no impact on the safe and secure environment. The unfavourable economic situation, together with late payment of salaries, led to further strikes in Sarajevo and other major cities. These were handled professionally and capably by Bosnia and Herzegovina law enforcement agencies and had no impact on the overall security situation.

10. On 27 June, an explosion occurred at the Bugojno police station, killing one police officer and injuring six others. Several suspects have been arrested. The Bosnia and Herzegovina Prosecution Office is leading the investigation, in close cooperation with the State Investigation and Protection Agency.

11. The force of some 2,000 EUFOR troops is concentrated in Sarajevo, with liaison and observation teams deployed throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. EUFOR continued to conduct operations in line with its mandate: providing deterrence; ensuring continued compliance in relation to the responsibilities specified in the General Framework Agreement for Peace, annexes 1A and 2; and contributing to the maintenance of a safe and secure environment. EUFOR continued to support the Bosnia and Herzegovina law enforcement agencies in fighting organized crime in close cooperation with the European Union Police Mission. EUFOR also continued to stand ready to support the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in search of persons indicted for war crimes. EUFOR monitored the fifteenth anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre, which passed without incident.

12. Implementation of the new non-executive capacity-building tasks of the operation commenced during the reporting period: full operational capability was achieved on 1 July 2010. EUFOR participated in a number of combined capacity-building and training conferences together with representatives of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

13. EUFOR and the Armed Forces continued to conduct combined training in accordance with the EUFOR Armed Forces training calendar by including specialized training elements, and in line with international training requirements and standards.

14. EUFOR continued to monitor, mentor and advise in order to enhance the self-sustainability of Bosnia and Herzegovina capabilities. In this context, EUFOR monitored activities related to ammunition and weapons storage sites, civilian and military movement of weapons and military equipment, disposal of surplus weapons and ammunition, and defence industry factories. Demining activities have also continued. According to the Bosnia and Herzegovina mine action strategy (2009-2019), the territory should be free of mines by 2019.

## IV. Outlook

15. The security situation is expected to remain stable, despite the prospects of continuing political tension.

United Nations S 2010 657

# Security Council

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## Letter dated 21 December 2010 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to convey the attached communication dated 16 December 2010, which I have received from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, transmitting the quarterly report on the operations of the International Security Assistance Force operations in Afghanistan, covering the period from 1 August to 31 October 2010 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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## Annex

### Letter dated 16 December 2010 from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with Security Council resolutions 1386 (2001) and 1943 (2010), I attach a report on the operations of the International Security Assistance Force covering the period from August to October 2010 (see enclosure). I would appreciate your making this report available to the Security Council

(*Signed*) Anders Fogh **Rasmussen**

## Enclosure

# Quarterly report to the Security Council on the operations of the International Security Assistance Force

### Introduction

1. The present report, pursuant to the request under Security Council resolution 1943 (2010), informs the United Nations on the progress of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission, covering the period from 1 August to 31 October 2010. As at 25 October 2010, total ISAF strength stood at 130,432 personnel provided by 28 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries and 20 non-NATO countries. This includes the addition of one new country, Tonga, during the quarter.

2. Throughout the reporting period, ISAF continued to assist the Government of Afghanistan in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions. From 1 August to 31 October 2010, ISAF suffered 2,201 casualties, including 179 killed in action, 2,007 wounded in action and 15 non-battle-related deaths.

3. As the preparation process for transition continues, ISAF has extended its focus on the training and mentorship of various entities within the Afghan National Security Forces. Recognizing that vital gaps existed, ISAF expanded its capacity and capabilities to cover its mandate in a more comprehensive manner. Focusing on the ultimate objective of enabling Afghanistan to become self-reliant and sustainable in the very near term, NATO/ISAF invites additional United Nations member States to support this United Nations-mandated mission by providing trainers, mentors and enablers for the Afghan National Security Forces as well as for the civilian sectors of governance and development.

Noteworthy points for this reporting period include the following:

(a) As reported in the Independent Election Commission press release of 20 October, the voter turnout for the parliamentary elections, 18 September 2010, was approximately 44 per cent of all registered Afghans. Afghan-led security operations before, during and following the elections prevented any major or high-profile insurgent attacks and, therefore, can be considered successful and an improvement from last year's presidential election;

(b) The Afghan National Security Forces surpassed their force strength objective of 243,000 for October 2010, three months ahead of schedule, reaching a current total of 261,000 personnel;

(c) The necessary follow-up to the endorsement of the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program was the establishment of the High Peace Council, a body intended to provide strategic guidance and broad-based political support for peace and reintegration activities;

(d) In line with the commitment by the Government of Afghanistan to strengthen its accountability and combat corruption stressed at the Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan, ISAF established the Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force Shafafiyat ("transparency") in late August 2010. The objective of the Task Force is to foster a common understanding of the problem of corruption in Afghanistan and integrate ISAF support to anti-corruption efforts with key partners in the Government of Afghanistan and the international community;

(e) Presidential Decree No. 62, in which President Hamid Karzai ordered the disbanding of private security companies, prompted ISAF and the international community to work closely with the Government of Afghanistan to coordinate the phased implementation of the decree, ensuring that ISAF and the international community continue to focus on enhancing security and supporting improvement of governance and development, while maintaining the necessary security levels for bases, logistical convoys and development projects;

(f) Following the announcement by President Karzai in July, the Afghan National Security Council in August approved the establishment of the Afghan Local Police. The Afghan Local Police is a temporary village-focused programme working under the Ministry of Interior, aimed at accelerating counter-insurgency efforts in areas with insufficient Afghan National Security Force presence. The Afghan Local Police will serve as an early warning and initial village defence element against insurgent activity. It currently has a cap of 10,000 personnel designated for 68 sites across the country. At the end of the reporting period, 8 sites were operational, with more than 1,000 Afghan Local Police personnel assigned, and an additional 17 were planned for establishment in 2011. ISAF works to collaborate with and support officials of the Ministry of Interior in the review, selection and validation of districts designated for the establishment of Afghan Local Police units. Shuras provide the integrating platform for the Afghan Local Police programme and local leadership.

**Security situation**

4. The Afghan security environment remains complex, with a resilient insurgency that still retains the capacity to attack the Government of Afghanistan, the Afghan National Security Forces and the International Security Assistance Force. However, coalition operations significantly reduced the enemy's ability to attack in a number of key terrain districts during the reporting period. Risk still exists as many of the factors that sustain the insurgency and impede effective counter-insurgency operations remain. While the Afghan National Security Forces and ISAF operations have increased pressure on insurgent networks over the past several months, the insurgency has proven resilient, with sustained logistics capacity and command and control. Larger and more focused security operations have begun to further increase pressure on all aspects of the insurgents' ability to operate, and in particular in their strongholds. The insurgents are likely to retain some freedom of movement, mainly in rural areas with less Afghan National Security Forces/International Security Assistance Force presence, as long as they have access to out-of-country safe havens and support networks. The strategic goal of the insurgency remains unchanged: inflict significant losses to ISAF in order to undermine international support for the mission and prompt a withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan.

5. Regionally, the security situation is as follows:

(a) *Regional Command Capital*. The security situation in Regional Command Capital was stable, and the insurgents were unable successfully to execute complex or high profile attacks in Kabul during events with high media attention (Independence Day on 19 August 2010, and parliamentary elections on 18 September 2010);

(b) *Regional Command North.* Kunduz and Baghlan provinces remain the most affected areas in this region. There are reports of uncertainty within insurgent networks, mainly caused by the increase in combined forces (ISAF and Afghan National Security Forces) and the subsequent increased operational tempo in the Regional Command North. Additionally, reintegration efforts in Baghlan and Faryab negatively affected the capabilities of the insurgent networks;

(c) *Regional Command West.* Successful International Security Assistance Force/Afghan National Security Forces operations conducted during the previous period have had a major impact on the insurgent leadership's ability to keep activity at a relatively high level. Numerous reintegration opportunities have emerged, particularly in Badghis and Farah provinces, which could indicate that insurgents' losses are having a detrimental impact on their morale and willingness to continue fighting against the Afghan National Security Forces and ISAF.

(d) *Regional Command South and Regional Command Southwest.* The south and southwest of the country remain the heart of the insurgency. The Afghan National Security Forces, in partnership with ISAF, have been conducting major operations in the region to assert government control. Operations continue and progress has been made. The city of Kandahar has largely been secured, and insurgents' freedom of movement and sanctuaries in both Kandahar and Helmand provinces have gradually been reduced. On 1 August, the multinational ISAF-flagged Combined Team-Uruzgan assumed responsibility for ISAF operations in Uruzgan province.

(e) *Regional Command East.* The eastern part of Afghanistan remains a main focal point for insurgent activities. Although most were ineffective, several complex attacks against the Afghan National Security Forces and ISAF and officials of the Government of Afghanistan were conducted in this region during the reporting period. The threat in the districts bordering Pakistan remains high. Access to out-of-country sanctuaries and resupply areas in the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan remains a key factor in the insurgents' ability to attack Afghan National Security Forces and ISAF units, government officials and civilians.

6. Improvised explosive device attacks remained the primary cause of casualties among ISAF, the Afghan National Security Forces and Afghan civilians, with a total of 2,008 detonations during the reporting period. In the same period, 2,267 devices were discovered and eliminated, representing 53 per cent of all such events. Especially towards the end of October 2010, and with increased pressure on the insurgents, the ratio between detonations and discoveries of the devices shifted positively towards the latter.

**Afghan National Security Forces**

7. The Afghan National Security Forces have a total of approximately 261,000 personnel as of October 2010. Having surpassed October 2010 growth targets for the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police in July, both entities have continued to expand. ISAF training capacity continues to grow, with approximately 28,000 Afghans currently in various training programmes.

8. ISAF efforts have been focused on meeting growth targets for Afghan National Security Force personnel; however, the focus is now on building a more balanced and self-sustaining force. The Afghan National Security Force training centres and

literacy programmes, which provide a basic education level (reading and writing Dari or Pashtu and mathematics) are a fundamental element of ISAF efforts to professionalize the Forces.

**Afghan National Army**

9. During this quarter the Afghan National Army's strength grew by approximately 24,000, expanding the force to just above 144,000, thus exceeding the October 2010 target of 134,000. The Afghan National Army continues to make steady progress towards the next growth target of 171,600 by October 2011.

10. The operational effectiveness of the Afghan National Army is progressing steadily, evidenced by lead responsibility for security during the parliamentary elections and the progressive increases in Afghan leadership in ongoing security operations in Kandahar Province. Challenges in operational effectiveness include leadership, staff planning, tactical command and control, and logistics. The focus for 2011 is fielding the institutions and organizations that support and sustain the force. The Afghan National Army's ability to sustain itself is critical to enable a successful transition to the Afghan National Security Force lead for security responsibility starting in early 2011.

11. While aggregate strength numbers are consistently achieved, the Afghan National Army's structure is still unbalanced. With mitigation efforts, it is assessed that the deficit of officers and non-commissioned officers will stabilize in 2011. Two new training facilities are being established with the capacity to train an additional 6,000 non-commissioned officers annually. Current projections predict that the deficit of non-commissioned officers will shrink by approximately 4,700 over the next year.

12. Included in the growth of the Afghan National Army is the commissioning of 29 female Second Lieutenants from officer candidate school, supporting the objective of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000). This is the first such event since the fall of the Taliban from power, marking a major step towards advancing gender rights in Afghanistan.

**Afghan Air Force**

13. The Afghan Air Force continues to make progress, although like other parts of the Afghan National Security Forces, it still faces some professional challenges. Its strength has increased by 41 per cent (from 2,797 to 3,964) since November 2009, with 4,240 airmen projected by November 2010. The inventory of aircraft also increased, growing by 19 per cent, from 42 to 47 serviceable aircraft. The Afghan Air Force requirement is a target of 146 airframes and 5,600 airmen by fiscal year 2016.

14. Four Afghan Air Force Mi-17 helicopters provided disaster relief to both Afghanistan and Pakistan following recent devastating floods. During 27 days, Afghan Air Force crews executed over 400 sorties, conducted 120 life-saving rescues, transported 1,904 passengers and delivered 188 tons of critical supplies in Pakistan.

### Afghan National Police

15. During this quarter, Afghan National Police strength grew by close to 1,000, expanding the force to approximately 117,000. Like the Afghan National Army, the Afghan National Police surpassed the 31 October 2010 target strength of 109,000 in July, three months ahead of schedule. Overall, the Afghan National Police continued to make progress towards its future target of 136,000 by October 2011.

16. Although overall Afghan National Police recruiting met monthly goals, the Afghan National Civil Order Police attrition rate continued to exceed the 1.4 per cent target. Afghan National Civil Order Police recruiting also remained a challenge, with too few recruits joining this competent force. The Ministry of Interior and NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan are looking at ways to mitigate both of those negative factors.

17. The professionalization of the Afghan National Police continues to be the highest priority for the Mission, with "leader development" and literacy training seen as pivotal to the process. As in the previous quarter, the turnover of personnel continues to place intense demands on the institutional training establishment with officer and non-commissioned officer growth rates lagging behind overall force growth. Low literacy rates are extending training requirements and limiting the output of the training base. Field promotions helped to mitigate non-commissioned officer shortages, but this will be a continuing problem throughout the next year. Expansion of the training base is flexible enough to meet current training demands.

18. Afghan National Police operational effectiveness improved slightly this quarter. Challenges in effectiveness include logistics and leadership. The Ministry of Interior is working with the Mission to better resource the Afghan National Police logistically.

### Institutional capacity

19. Development of the institutional capabilities of both the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior has made progress this quarter, but is still assessed as needing international support. The most recent Ministerial Development Board projects that the Ministry of Interior will achieve self-sufficiency no earlier than December 2012. Institutional development lags behind force growth owing to conscious decisions to expand the combat force at the expense of support personnel. Rebalancing the force is critical for 2011 to reduce reliance on ISAF and to establish the links between the fielded force and the governing ministries.

### Civilian casualties

20. The significant increase in ISAF troop numbers and the high operational tempo has not resulted in an increase of civilian casualties caused by ISAF this quarter when compared to the previous reporting period. ISAF maintains its commitment to take all necessary steps to shield civilians from harm. The number of civilian casualties caused by insurgents continued to increase, expanding by approximately 50 per cent compared to the previous quarter. Ninety per cent of all casualties suffered by civilians are caused by insurgent activities.

**Counter-narcotics**

21. The drug trade continues to fund the insurgency. ISAF continued to support the Government of Afghanistan and its specialized units in the conduct of the overall Afghan counter-narcotics strategy. During the reporting period, ISAF operations conducted in support of Afghan units (Afghan National Security Forces, Counter-Narcotics Police) resulted in the seizure of 14 tons of opium, 2.2 tons of heroin, 2.6 tons of hashish and 70 kg of morphine worth an estimated value of $9 million. Furthermore, the Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force-Nexus performed information-sharing tasks with the Joint Narcotics Analysis Centre, the Interagency Operations Coordination Centre, the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States of America and the Serious Organised Crime Agency of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to develop a common operating picture at the regional, strategic and international levels.

**Governance**

22. To ensure enduring security, ISAF and responsible Afghan ministries successfully cooperated with the Independent Election Committee in the conduct of the Afghan parliamentary elections in September 2010.

23. A significant initiative to improve the security environment was the Afghan peace and reintegration programme, which was endorsed at the Kabul Conference in July. ISAF has partnered with the Government of Afghanistan to support the programme's further development and implementation. ISAF has and will continue to support the programme's public awareness activities and assist the Government of Afghanistan in their outreach to encourage insurgent fighters to lay down their weapons and peacefully reintegrate into Afghan society. Furthermore, ISAF has continued its suppo.. to enable the Government of Afghanistan to establish structures at both the national and subnational levels to facilitate effective reintegration.

24. The gradually improved security environment that the International Security Assistance Force and the Afghan National Security Forces are delivering in and around the major population centres has served as a catalyst for local governance. Although challenges still remain, the following are of note:

(a) The allocation by individual ISAF contributors of Commanders' Emergency Response Procedures projects in Kandahar Province has been helping Government of Afghanistan officials from both the short- and long-term perspectives to respond to pressing community needs. Military commanders and civilian experts are working in concert with local leaders to lay the foundation for the delivery of basic services such as clean water, education and health care;

(b) Throughout Helmand Province, efforts have been supporting linking villages and districts to the provincial government. Daily shuras with village elders are progressively changing local Afghan perceptions and bridging the gap between the local and district governments, thereby expanding linkages to the central Government through the provision of a secure and stable environment;

(c) The first Afghan-run regional development conference, held in Mazar-e-Sharif with participants from the Government of Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force and the international community, was an important milestone in the evolution of Afghan governance and development. More

importantly, it met the Kabul conference commitment to align national and subnational governance agendas.

25. Through routine civil-military cooperation performed by the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in support of other government institutions, ISAF continuously engaged with Afghan officials at the national, subnational and local levels.

**Development**

26. This reporting period, facilitated by an increased ISAF and Afghan National Security Force presence and operational progress in key population centres in the south of Afghanistan, there was also a gradual improvement in the coordination of security and development efforts alongside enhanced outreach by the Government of Afghanistan in the region. For this reporting period the following are noteworthy:

(a) Operation Hamkari conducted by the Afghan National Security Forces/ISAF in Kandahar Province delivered improvements in the physical security infrastructure of Kandahar city. The improved security conditions have enabled new businesses to open in and around Kandahar city, increased freedom of movement and enhanced protection of the population. The Government of Afghanistan and development initiatives by the international community have grown alongside ISAF and Afghan National Security Force joint security operations — each reinforcing the gains of the other;

(b) Operation Moshtarak conducted by the Afghan National Security Forces/ISAF in Helmand Province has shown encouraging indications of the enabling effects that a steady accumulation of security gains can generate for governance and development efforts in the area. The improved security situation allowed voters in Marjah to register and to establish four election polling stations for the parliamentary elections. In September 2010, Helmand witnessed for the first time in six years the opening of a high school in Marjah district along with three other schools.

27. Evidence of slow but steady progress in development was seen by increased government revenues and small improvements in health, education, the macroeconomy and infrastructure. Notwithstanding reported signs of progress, the ability of governance and development to keep pace with security operations still remains at risk owing to the current limitations of Afghan capabilities and capacities across the country.

28. The International Security Assistance Force therefore continues to recognize and stress the importance of recognizing the explicit link between governance, security and development. Without persistent and successful growth in all three areas, gains in any one are likely to be unsustainable in the longer term. An increase in civilian involvement is judged necessary for an irreversible movement towards transition and the goal outlined by the Government of Afghanistan for the Afghan National Security Forces to be in the lead for security across the country by the end of 2014.

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# Report of the Secretary-General on the request of Nepal for United Nations assistance in support of its peace process

## I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1939 (2010), by which the Council, following the request of the Government of Nepal and the recommendation of the Secretary-General, extended the current mandate of the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) for the last time, until 15 January 2011. UNMIN was established as a special political mission in 2007 with a mandate that includes the monitoring of the management of arms and armed personnel of the Nepal Army and the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M), which is now the Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M). The present report reviews the progress of the peace process and the implementation of the mandate of UNMIN since my last report to the Security Council, of 2 September 2010 (S/2010/453).

## II. Progress of the peace process

2. Despite continued efforts, the parties have achieved only limited progress in advancing the peace process during the reporting period. Intensified, though sporadic, discussions have taken place, but the parties have yet to take a number of political decisions that would generate momentum in the main tasks of the peace process, namely, the future of the two armies and the promulgation of the Constitution. Some procedural decisions were reached relating to the establishment and functioning of the secretariat of the Special Committee to supervise, integrate and rehabilitate Maoist army personnel, and a high-level task force was established to address contentious issues in the drafting of the constitution.

3. Most substantive progress has been stymied by the continued mistrust among the main political parties and the resulting impasse. At the centre of this is the unresolved issue of forming a new government following the resignation of Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal on 30 June 2010. Sixteen rounds of voting in the Legislature-Parliament have failed to produce a new prime minister. Options for power-sharing have been discussed by the parties, so far inconclusively. Although the broad parameters of a potential understanding on the main outstanding issues can be discerned, the sequencing of implementation remains to be agreed upon.

4. The parties maintain that they seek consensus towards breaking the deadlock, but the movement away from their fixed positions has been difficult to achieve in



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practice. The Nepali Congress has maintained its candidate for the premiership, Ram Chandra Poudel, despite 16 rounds of unsuccessful voting in the Constituent Assembly, of which he has been the sole contender in 9. UML has maintained its neutral stance in voting, and UCPN-M has voiced its opposition to Poudel's candidacy, making it unlikely that he will secure the necessary majority in the absence of a political settlement.

5. An agreement by UCPN-M not to block submission by the Government of a basic budget broke down on 19 November when the Government presented a full budget and UCPN-M responded by physically manhandling the Minister of Finance in the Legislature-Parliament. The Legislature-Parliament was subsequently prorogued by the President on the recommendation of the caretaker Prime Minister, and the budget was passed by ordinance. The opposition questioned the authority of a caretaker government to involve the President in this matter. The suspension of the Legislature-Parliament has also raised questions about the future voting for the premiership and the implementation of the budget. On 12 December, UCPN-M, along with some smaller parties, formally requested the President to summon the House. In public pronouncements, the caretaker Prime Minister has indicated that the House would be reconvened only after the political deadlock is resolved.

6. In late September, at the first General Convention of the Nepali Congress since 2005, Sushil Koirala was elected party president, succeeding the late Girija Prasad Koirala, following a close contest with former Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba. The UCPN-M Central Committee plenum concluded on 26 November with the leadership presenting a united front, but reportedly without having settled significant internal differences. The final document set the peace and constitution-drafting processes as the party's priority, while also speaking of preparations for a "people's revolt" should this process fail. Significant numbers of Maoist army personnel took part in the plenum despite UNMIN having termed this contrary to the spirit of the peace agreements.

7. UNMIN sought, but has yet to receive, clarification from the parties on the scope of the unwritten "gentlemen's agreement", which reportedly addresses the issue of the Nepal Army's confinement and the implementation of its national responsibilities. The agreement thus carries implications for the monitoring of arms and armies by UNMIN.

8. UNMIN has continued its efforts to ensure the Mission's orderly withdrawal on 15 January 2011 intensifying engagement with the relevant parties over the integration and rehabilitation of Maoist army personnel and on alternative monitoring arrangements. The Mission has continued to urge the parties to address the future of the Agreement on the Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies and the Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee.

9. In line with the request of the Security Council, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, B. Lynn Pascoe, visited Nepal in October and again in December to assess progress in the peace process. Meeting with a range of interlocutors, he called on the parties urgently to reach the necessary political agreements to resolve outstanding issues, primarily the integration and rehabilitation of Maoist army personnel, ahead of the departure of UNMIN.

## A. Drafting of the constitution

10. The high-level task force headed by UCPN-M Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal has reached agreement on more than half of the 210 unresolved issues related to the new constitution, most notably on the federal structure at the provincial level, the use of official languages at the federal and provincial levels, citizenship and the judiciary. Some issues of fundamental importance, such as forms of government and the federal structure, remain unresolved. The parties have decided not to extend the mandate of the task force, which expired on 11 December.

11. The Constitutional Committee was unable to meet the 17 November deadline for preparing a first draft of the constitution, contributing to concerns about meeting the 28 May 2011 deadline for its promulgation.

## B. Integration and rehabilitation of Maoist army personnel

12. The Special Committee to supervise, integrate and rehabilitate Maoist army personnel formed a secretariat comprising the former members of the Technical Committee, along with one representative from each of the security forces and from the Maoist army. The Committee subsequently appointed a secretariat coordinator. No decisions have been reached on the number, entry norms or modalities for Maoist army personnel to be integrated into the security forces, or on support packages for those choosing a rehabilitation option.

13. At the request of the Special Committee, UNMIN provided data on verified Maoist army personnel to the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction. The secretariat proposes to collect additional data and preferences for integration, rehabilitation, or "voluntary exit" with a cash package, through a survey of personnel in the cantonments.

14. During the visit of the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs in early December, the secretariat coordinator presented the outline of a six-week plan to recruit and deploy liaison teams for all the cantonments, as well as to take over monitoring responsibilities from UNMIN. The plan has not been developed in detail, and has yet to be endorsed by UCPN-M. The Special Committee has also stated that it could bring the Maoist army under its supervision within two weeks after the necessary political decisions have been taken and regroup personnel according to their preferences for integration, rehabilitation or voluntary discharge within a further 45 to 60 days.

## C. Other challenges facing the peace process

15. The security situation in the Tarai remains fragile, with continued reports of killings and abductions by criminal and armed groups. Such incidents have mostly targeted members of the business community and sometimes young children, primarily for ransom. In one particularly violent incident in early October, two schoolboys were abducted and killed near Nepalgunj, leading to spontaneous protests and sporadic clashes. Altercations between youth organizations affiliated to political parties have led to serious injuries and a number of deaths.

16. A renewed emphasis on identity-based politics could raise tensions in the lead-up to the promulgation of the new constitution. Madhesh-based parties have long voiced frustration at their exclusion from the dialogue on formation of the government. More recently they have resisted attempts by the Election Commission to update voter lists by using citizenship cards. They claim that this basis for registration would exclude more than 3 million Madheshi Nepali citizens. Other small parties have expressed concern that using other forms of identification to register voters will endanger national security by inadvertently granting the vote to non-Nepalis. On 2 November, the Election Commission made amendments to its registration guidelines, allowing certain documents other than the citizenship card to be used for registration. On 25 November, the Supreme Court issued an interim stay order, however, directing the Election Commission to stop registering voters with documentation other than the citizenship card.

# III. Activities of the United Nations Mission in Nepal

## A. Arms monitoring

17. The Arms Monitoring Office continued to monitor the compliance of the Nepal Army and the Maoist army with the Agreement on the Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies, maintaining round-the-clock surveillance of the Nepal Army weapons storage site and the weapons storage areas at the seven main cantonment sites of the Maoist army. Arms monitors also visited the satellite cantonment sites on a regular basis and conducted other operations using mobile teams.

18. During the reporting period, the Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee met five times and considered 15 alleged violations. Three cases have been resolved, one was dismissed, and 11 remain under investigation.

## B. Child protection

19. UNMIN continued to provide advisory support to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the implementation of rehabilitation programmes for former Maoist army personnel disqualified as minors, as well as to the United Nations mechanism monitoring compliance by UCPN-M with the discharge action plan. The Mission took the lead in organizing the visit to Nepal of the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict from 21 and 26 November, which was the first ever field visit of the Group. Its members assessed the progress and challenges in the protection of children affected by the conflict, with particular attention to the action plan signed in December 2009 for the discharge of disqualified Maoist personnel.

## C. Political affairs

20. The Political Affairs Office continued to monitor, analyse and report on the implications of the overall political situation, including the dynamics among the political parties, the role of traditionally marginalized groups and the proceedings of

the Constituent Assembly, and to assist Mission leadership in supporting the peace process.

### D. Public information

21. The Public Information and Translation Unit continued to monitor and engage with the media, disseminating products related to the work of the Mission and setting the record straight on a range of issues.

### E. Safety and security

22. The security situation remained relatively calm throughout the country, notwithstanding incidents of extortion and the explosion of improvised explosive devices carried out mostly by armed groups in the Tarai. There were no direct threats made against United Nations staff or property during the reporting period.

### F. Mission support

23. The mission support component continued to support UNMIN activities throughout the Mission area, and also prepared for the Mission's withdrawal in accordance with the approved liquidation plan. These activities are currently focused on asset disposal and preplanning for the withdrawal of arms monitors from cantonment sites. UNMIN also briefed embassies based in Kathmandu, non-governmental organizations and United Nations agencies on staff skills and arranged a visit from the Department of Field Support to address issues of staff placement. As at 29 November 2010, 254 of the authorized 278 personnel were serving in the Mission. Out of 182 civilian personnel, 29.12 per cent are women.

## IV. Human rights

24. No substantial progress was achieved in addressing impunity and ensuring accountability for human rights violations committed during or after the conflict. In September, UCPN-M suspended from its Central Committee a Maoist army commander against whom arrest warrants had been issued for his alleged involvement in the 2008 murder of businessman Ram Hari Shrestha as well as in the illegal trade of a traditional medicinal commodity. The suspension is for a period of three months, and it is unclear whether the commander retains his position within the Maoist army.

25. In contradiction to existing decisions of the Supreme Court and other lower courts, there are calls in some political quarters for the investigation and prosecution of cases of alleged human rights and international humanitarian law violations committed during the conflict to await the formation of the transitional justice mechanisms envisioned in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Bills for the establishment of such mechanisms were registered at the Legislature-Parliament in February 2010 but remain pending before the legislative committee, and in their current form do not provide for prosecutorial powers or for a direct handover of cases to the criminal justice system.

26. In September, OHCHR-Nepal released a summary of concerns entitled "Investigating allegations of extrajudicial killings in the Terai". The report documents 39 incidents in the Terai which resulted in the deaths of 57 persons between January 2008 and June 2010, all involving credible allegations of the unlawful use of force by security forces.

27. As part of its agreement with the Government, OHCHR-Nepal will phase out its regional offices by the end of the current year, but will continue to conduct field activities across Nepal.

## V. United Nations country team coordination

28. Political uncertainties continued to adversely affect Nepal's development operations. The 2011 budget was issued through an ordinance on 20 November, more than four months late, and has yet to be endorsed by the Legislature-Parliament. Significant delays and uncertainty surrounding its approval have affected revenues, expenditure and investment projections.

29. Throughout the reporting period, UNDP provided ongoing support to the voter registration process which reached approximately 1.3 million voters by the end of 2010 and is expected to reach more than 12 million voters by mid-2011.

30. The United Nations Inter-agency Rehabilitation Project, managed jointly by UNICEF, UNDP, the United Nations Population Fund and the International Labour Organization, continued to support the socio-economic rehabilitation of the 4,008 disqualified personnel verified as minors and late recruits who were discharged from the Maoist army in February 2010. Of those disqualified, over 1,800 have received counselling on their rehabilitation options, over 420 have completed their training, and over 100 graduates of the programme have achieved gainful wage or self-employment. The percentage of women in each category is 33, 27 and 40, respectively.

31. The United Nations mine action team continued to support the Government in the areas of coordination, clearance, risk education, victim assistance and advocacy. Currently, 33 of all 53 minefields have been cleared by the Nepal Army demining teams with technical support from the United Nations mine action team, and clearance of the remaining 20 minefields commenced in October 2010.

32. Led by the United Nations Resident Coordinator, and in consultation with the Government and local partners, Nepal's development partners and the United Nations country team formulated a peace and development strategy during the course of 2010. Set to be launched in January 2011, the strategy provides a framework for development partner support to the implementation of Nepal's Comprehensive Peace Agreement, seeks to improve impact and avoid the duplication, gaps and missed opportunities commonly seen as risks to peacebuilding efforts in transition situations.

33. While highlighting the renewed focus on longer-term development, the political deadlock leaves remaining needs and acute vulnerabilities unaddressed. According to the World Food Programme, in 2010 the number of food insecure people living in rural areas fluctuated between 3.2 and 3.5 million people — representing approximately 16 per cent of the rural population, of whom 1.6 million receive United Nations assistance. In addition, each year monsoon floods and

landslides affect hundreds and at times tens of thousands of people. While the Government has increased its capacity over the years, collaboration on building preparedness and response capacity has slowed. Increased sustainable medium to long-term measures are needed to reduce vulnerability and resolve the need for humanitarian assistance.

## VI. Observations

34. Nepal's peace process is at a crossroads. The journey that began a little over five years ago with the signing of the Twelve-point Understanding in November 2005 was solidified in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement a year later as well as through subsequent agreements and constitutional, legislative and political measures, has opened up the possibilities of substantial political and social reform. The United Nations is proud to have contributed its share to this nationally owned process in various ways. Not only did the United Nations deploy the Mission in record time following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, but it also assisted the parties to negotiate the arms monitoring agreement that has served as the basis for monitoring of the two armies and their arms as well as provided a mechanism for dispute resolution and confidence-building. The United Nations also provided considerable assistance to national authorities in conducting the historic Constituent Assembly election. But Nepal's journey towards sustainable peace is not finished, and the prolonged political deadlock that has hampered progress has become a growing concern for Nepalis and the international community alike as key timelines and deadlines approach in the coming months.

35. While the Government and the Maoists agreed in September 2010 that the remaining tasks of the peace process would be largely completed by mid-January 2011, this has so far proved elusive. Although there have been intensified efforts, including high-level talks in the first half of November, structured discussion has been limited. The country has remained under a caretaker government for the past six months with the parties unable to agree on the leadership and formation of a new government. The peace process still faces several challenges, above all that of promulgating a new constitution within the extended deadline of 28 May 2011 and integrating into the security forces or rehabilitating roughly 19,000 Maoist army personnel.

36. A number of other commitments contained in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the interim constitution have yet to be addressed and hold the seeds of fresh confrontation if expectations remain unmet. Polarized relations and deepening rifts among and within the political parties and the associated mistrust remain at the heart of the stalemate. This polarization is not insurmountable. The parties can and must find a way out of this situation. They have in the past made major compromises, and they must soon do the same. None of them can afford to put the entire process and the fruits of their hard work at serious risk. No one side can expect to win at the expense of others.

37. Throughout 2010, the parties have demonstrated their ability to forge agreement on some issues, most recently through the high-level task force on the new constitution, and earlier in the year over extension of the Constituent Assembly and the discharge of disqualified Maoist army personnel. There is still time for the parties to fulfil their peace process commitments and improve their political

dynamic. Much depends on their ability and willingness to take fresh measures, make necessary compromises and act on the acknowledged need for consensual approaches. It is vital for all political parties to focus on the long-term interests of the country and people of Nepal rather than on partisan interests. The successful conclusion of the peace process is entirely dependent on the parties' reaffirmation of their collective responsibility and a concrete demonstration of their capacity to compromise in the larger interest of the nation.

38. Rapid steps are needed to secure the integration and rehabilitation of Maoist army personnel in a mutually acceptable manner, which the United Nations would have liked to see prior to the departure of UNMIN in order to avoid any vacuum. There has similarly been no progress on the parallel commitment to determine the right number and democratize the Nepal Army, as the parties recognized, this, too, is vital for Nepal's future stability. My Representative has sought clarity about the status of the Agreement on Monitoring the Management of Arms and Armies and the Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee, respectively the basis of the arms monitoring arrangement and its critical dispute resolution mechanism. At this point, however, the parties do not yet have an agreed plan for follow-on arrangements for the monitoring of arms and armies. In the absence of broader political agreement, this is cause for concern.

39. At the request of the Government of Nepal, the Security Council decided on 15 September 2010 that the present UNMIN mandate would be terminated on 15 January 2011. UNMIN was set up as a short-term mission. Its mandate of supporting the electoral process and the monitoring of the management of arms and armies were foreseen as transitional arrangements. In the absence of an agreement on the future of Maoist army personnel, which must be arrived at through dialogue and compromise, the monitoring mandate has been extended repeatedly, at the request of the parties, for two and a half years after the successful Constituent Assembly election. Beyond its monitoring role, UNMIN has been a positive factor in the difficult context of the process during this period. However, it has had a limited mandate that did not enable it to provide greater support in resolving political difficulties in the peace process as a whole. With the peace process still incomplete and uncertain arrangements for supervision, integration and rehabilitation of Maoist army personnel, the optimal conditions for the departure of UNMIN have not yet been attained. But at the same time, it has become quite clear that it makes little sense to extend continually UNMIN without any meaningful progress by the parties on political issues.

40. The United Nations has consistently emphasized Nepal's sovereignty and ownership of its own peace process. The United Nations will continue its long-standing support to the search for sustainable peace in Nepal, and I will follow closely all developments in Nepal's peace process and remain engaged, keeping the Security Council informed as necessary. I am certain the Council will continue to maintain an interest in the success of the peace process and would be ready to respond to its needs, as required. The United Nations entities in Nepal will assist in the rehabilitation of Maoist army personnel when the time comes, as well as continue to lend support to the constitution-drafting process and the many medium- and longer-term elements of peacebuilding.

41. I am confident that the advances made in Nepal's unique peace process will not easily be reversed, and I urge all the parties to do their utmost to preserve these

gains, to complete the peace process successfully and ensure the country's democratic stability. Such processes are never easy, and Nepal has managed its own peace process with greater goodwill and steadiness than have many other countries in similar post-war settings.

42. I wish to convey my appreciation to the members of the Security Council and other Member States for their long-standing support to Nepal and to the work of the United Nations in support of the peace process, and to thank my Representative, Karin Landgren, her predecessors, her staff and partner organizations in Nepal for their dedicated efforts.

United Nations S/2010/659

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 December 2010

Original: English

# Letter dated 23 December 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

In my capacity as the last Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1132 (1997) concerning Sierra Leone, I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Committee (see annex), which contains an account of the Committee's activities during the period 1 January to 29 September 2010, when the Committee was dissolved with the adoption of Council resolution 1940 (2010). The report is submitted in accordance with the note by the President of the Security Council of 29 March 1995 (S/1995/234).

(*Signed*) Nawaf **Salam**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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**Annex**

# Report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1132 (1997) concerning Sierra Leone

## I. Introduction

1. The present report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1132 (1997) concerning Sierra Leone covers the period from 1 January to 29 September 2010, when the Committee was dissolved with the adoption of Council resolution 1940 (2010).

2. From 1 January to 29 September 2010, the Bureau of the Committee consisted of Nawaf Salam (Lebanon) as Chairman, with the delegations of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Brazil providing the Vice-Chairs.

## II. Background information and summary of the work of the Committee

### A. Background information

3. By its resolution 1132 (1997), the Security Council, determining that the situation in Sierra Leone following the military coup of 25 May 1997 constituted a threat to international peace and security in the region, imposed a mandatory ban on the sale or supply by States to Sierra Leone of arms and related materiel, as well as petroleum and petroleum products. By the same resolution, the Council also imposed travel restrictions on members of the military junta and adult members of their families, and decided to establish a Committee to oversee the implementation of the measures.

4. Subsequently, by its resolution 1156 (1998), the Council lifted the oil embargo. By its resolution 1171 (1998), the Council confirmed the removal of sanctions on the Government and reimposed the arms embargo on non-governmental forces, as well as the travel ban on leading members of the Revolutionary United Front and of the former military junta. The Council also decided that States would notify all exports from their territories of arms or related materiel to Sierra Leone to the Committee established by resolution 1132 (1997), that the Government of Sierra Leone would mark, register and notify to the Committee all imports made by it of those items, and that the Committee would report regularly to the Council on notifications so received.

5. In its resolution 1306 (2000), the Council decided, inter alia, that all States should, for an initial period of 18 months, prohibit the direct or indirect import of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone to their territory. In the same resolution, the Council also decided that diamonds controlled by the Government of Sierra Leone through the certificate of origin regime would be exempt from those measures. The prohibitions on diamonds not controlled by the certificate of origin regime were extended for additional periods of 11 months and 6 months, respectively, by resolutions 1385 (2001) and 1446 (2002).

6. On 5 June 2003, the President of the Security Council read out a statement to the press in which he noted, inter alia, that in the light of the increased efforts of the Government of Sierra Leone to control and manage its diamond industry and ensure proper control over diamond-mining areas, as well as the Government's full participation in the Kimberley Process, the members of the Council had agreed not to renew the prohibition against the import of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone not controlled by the certificate of origin regime.

7. By its resolution 1793 (2007), the Council decided to exempt from the travel ban the travel of any witnesses whose presence was required at trials before the Special Court for Sierra Leone.

8. By its resolution 1940 (2010), the Council decided to terminate, with immediate effect, the measures set forth in paragraphs 2, 4, and 5 of resolution 1171 (1998). The Council further decided to dissolve the Committee established by paragraph 10 of resolution 1132 (1997) with immediate effect.

## B. Summary of the activities of the Committee

9. Although the Committee held no formal meetings or informal consultations during the reporting period, it was able to successfully carry out its work through written procedures. During the period under review, the Committee received three notifications of exports of arms and related materiel to Sierra Leone pursuant to paragraph 4 of resolution 1171 (1998).

10. In a letter dated 14 June 2010, the Permanent Mission of the Netherlands to the United Nations notified the Chairman of the Committee of the temporary transfer of Issa H. Sesay from Kigali to The Hague, to appear as a witness in the trial of Charles Taylor before the Special Court for Sierra Leone. The letter also provided relevant information in connection with the temporary transfer of Mr. Sesay from Kigali to The Hague. Mr. Sesay was convicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone on 25 February 2009 and is serving his prison sentence in Rwanda. He was subject to the travel ban imposed by paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1171 (1998) and his travel to The Hague took place under an exemption to the travel ban provided for by paragraph 8 of resolution 1793 (2007), by which the Council decided to exempt from the travel ban the travel of any witnesses whose presence was required at trials before the Special Court for Sierra Leone.

11. In a letter dated 31 August 2010, the Permanent Mission of the Netherlands to the United Nations notified the Chairman of the Committee that Mr. Sesay, who had appeared as a witness before the Special Court for Sierra Leone in The Hague, was due to return to Kigali on 2 September 2010 to serve the remainder of his prison sentence. The letter also provided relevant information in connection with the return of Mr. Sesay to Rwanda.

## C. Violations and alleged violations of the sanctions regime

12. During the reporting period, no violations or alleged violations of the sanctions regime were brought to the attention of the Committee.

United Nations

S/2010/660

# Security Council

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20 December 2010

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## Letter dated 14 December 2010 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council

I wish to refer to my sixth report on the activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa, covering the period from 1 July to 31 December 2010 (S/2010/614). In my report, I recommend that the mandate of the Office be further renewed for a period of three years, from 1 January 2011 to 31 December 2013.

I submit herewith, to the members of the Security Council, the draft mandate of the Office, elaborating its core functions, which are to be implemented in close collaboration with the Economic Community of West African States, the Mano River Union, and other regional and subregional partners (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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## Annex

### Draft mandate of the United Nations Office for West Africa

The following objectives are to be implemented in close collaboration with the Economic Community of West African States, the Mano River Union and other regional and subregional partners:

**Objective 1**

**Monitor political developments in West Africa, carry out good offices roles and special assignment on behalf of the Secretary-General and enhance subregional capacities for conflict prevention and mediation in countries of the subregion.**

*Function 1.1*

Monitor and analyse the situation in West Africa, in particular emerging threats to peace, and provide the Secretary-General, the Security Council, regional and subregional organizations and national Governments with early warning and recommendations for preventive action.

*Function 1.2*

Perform good offices roles in countries of the subregion to prevent conflict and to consolidate peacebuilding efforts and political stability.

*Function 1.3*

Enhance subregional capacities for conflict prevention, conflict management, mediation, and good offices, including providing support to existing subregional mechanisms, in particular the Conflict Prevention Framework, of the Economic Community of West African States and the Community's Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security.

*Function 1.4*

Facilitate the implementation of the International Court of Justice ruling of 10 October 2002 on the land and maritime boundary dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria.

**Objective 2**

**Enhance subregional capacities to address cross-border and cross-cutting threats to peace and security, in particular, election-related instability and challenges related to security sector reform, transnational organized crime, illicit trafficking and terrorism.**

*Function 2.1*

Raise awareness and promote integrated subregional and cross-border responses to potential problems and emerging threats to peace, human security and stability in the subregion.

*Function 2.2*

Support the development of networks of practitioners and subregional frameworks and mechanisms to address challenges related to security sector reform, transnational organized crime, illicit trafficking and terrorism.

*Function 2.3*

Facilitate systematic and regular linkages in the work of the United Nations within the subregion to promote a coherent and synergetic United Nations approach to addressing the causes of instability and conflict in West Africa.

**Objective 3**

**Promote good governance and respect for the rule of law, human rights and the mainstreaming of gender in conflict prevention and conflict management initiatives in West Africa.**

*Function 3.1*

Facilitate the exchange of information and the sharing of best practices among national Governments, regional organizations, civil society and other entities for the promotion of good governance, respect for the rule of law and the improvement of electoral processes.

*Function 3.2*

Provide support for the enactment of resolutions and frameworks of action pertaining to the respect for human rights, and the mainstreaming of gender in conflict prevention and conflict management initiatives in West Africa.

United Nations S/2010/661

Security Council

Distr.: General
20 December 2010

Original: English

## Letter dated 20 December 2010 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 14 December 2010 (S/2010/660) concerning the mandate of the United Nations Office for West Africa has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

The members of the Security Council concur with the recommendation, contained in your sixth report on the activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa (S/2010/614), to extend the mandate of the Office for a further period of three years, from 1 January 2011 to 31 December 2013. In this regard, the members of the Council encourage you to actively explore the possibility of direct contributions from Member States, in addition to the availability of resources from within the United Nations.

The members of the Security Council also take note of your intention to revise the functions and activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa, as reflected in the draft mandate annexed to your letter. The members of the Council request that you report to the Council every six months on the fulfilment by the Office of its revised mandate.

(*Signed*) Susan E. **Rice**
President of the Security Council

10-70729 (E) 281210

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